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significance." 74 Accordingly, a trial court cannot declare a

mistrial simply because a delay would be inconvenient.
The Stanley court referred to double jeopardy protection under
both the Federal and New York State Constitutions. 7 5 Both
prohibit retrial for the same crime unless there is manifest
necessity for the mistrial. 76 New York has codified some of these
principles in Criminal Procedure Law section 280.10(3). 7 7 Under
section 280.10(3) the trial judge must declare a mistrial under
78
certain circumstances.

CRIMINAL COURT
NEW YORK CITY
People v. Frank79
(decided September 11, 1995)

The defendant moved for a dismissal claiming that the
temporary suspension of his driver's license, due to his alleged
refusal to submit to a chemical test, constituted double jeopardy
in violation of both the New York State80 and Federal
74. Id.
75. Stanley v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 625 N.Y.S.2d 622, 622
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1995).
76. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d at 9, 394 N.E.2d at 1138, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 375.
77. N.Y. CPi. PRoc. LAW § 280.10(3) (McKinney 1993).
78. N.Y. CRri. PRoc. LAW § 280.10(3). Section 280.10(3) provides in
pertinent part:
At any time during the trial, the court must declare a mistrial and order
a new trial of the indictment under the following circumstances:
3. Upon motion of either party or upon the court's own motion,
when it is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in
conformity with law.
Id.
79. 631 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Crim. Ct. New York County 1995).
80. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense. . . ." Id.
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Constitutions. 81 The Criminal Court of the City of New York
found that the suspension of the defendant's driver's license was
neither punishment nor was it imposed in a separate proceeding
82
and, therefore, did not establish double jeopardy.
On December 2, 1994, Frank was arrested and charged with
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated pursuant to section
1192(3) of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law [hereinafter
VTL], 83 operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs
pursuant to section 1192(4) of the VTL, 84 and unlawful
possession of marijuana pursuant to section 221.05 of the Penal
Law. 85 The defendant was arraigned on December 3, 1994, and
the court temporarily suspended his driver's license pending

prosecution based upon his alleged refusal to submit to a
chemical test pursuant to section 1194(2)86 of the VTL. 87 The
defendant moved for a dismissal on the basis that the continued
prosecution constituted a double jeopardy violation.

81. Frank, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 1015; U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth
Amendment provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Id.
82. Frank, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 1018.
83. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Section
1192(3) provides: "Driving while intoxicated. No person shall operate a motor
vehicle while in an intoxicated condition." Id.
84. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(4) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Section
1192(4) provides: "Driving while ability impaired by drugs. No person shall
operate a motor vehicle while the person's ability to operate such a motor
vehicle is impaired by the use of a drug as defined in this chapter." Id.
85. Frank, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 1015. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.05
(McKinney 1989). This section provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty
of unlawful possession of marihuana when he knowingly and unlawfully
possesses marihuana." Id.
86. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
87. Frank, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 1015. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1996). Section 1194(2) provides in relevant part:
Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed
to have given consent to a chemical test of one or more of the
following: breath, blood, urine, or saliva, for the purpose of
determining the alcoholic and/or drug content of the blood provided that
such test is administered by or at the direction of a police officer ....
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In Blockburger v. United States,88 the Supreme Court set forth
a test to ascertain what would constitute the "same offense" for
double jeopardy purposes. 89 The Court stated that the test "to

determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether
each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not." 90
Subsequently, in Grady v. Corbin,9 1 the Court modified the
principles set forth in Blockburger. In Grady, the Court
articulated the "same conduct" test, holding that successive
prosecutions would be barred if the second prosecution required
relitigation of the factual issues already resolved in the first
prosecution, and the government would be required to prove
conduct that constituted an offense for which the defendant had
already been prosecuted. 9 2 However, in United States v.
Dixon,9 3 the Court overruled the Grady "same conduct" test and

reinstated the test in Blockburger as the applicable standard to be

88. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). In Blockburger, the United States Supreme
Court held that two sales of morphine not from the original package, the
second having been initiated after the first was complete, were separate and
distinct offenses under a narcotics statute. Id. at 301. The Court noted that
although the buyer and seller remained the same, time had elapsed between the
first and second transactions. Id. The legislative intent underlying the statute
was explored by the Court so that it could determine whether "each provision
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." Id. at 304.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 495 U.S. 508 (1990) overnded by United States v. Dixon, 113 S.Ct.
2849 (1993). In Grady, the defendant was issued two traffic tickets for driving
while intoxicated and for failure to keep to the right of the median. Id. at 511.
The defendant's automobile accident resulted in one fatality and an injury to
another. Id. The defendant pled guilty to the traffic offenses. Id. at 513.
Following his indictment for reckless manslaughter, the defendant claimed that
this subsequent prosecution was for the same offense for which he had already
pled guilty and, thus, constitutionally barred on double jeopardy grounds. Id.
at 513-14.
92. Id. at 521.
93. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
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Notwithstanding the principles of Blockburger, Frank's counsel
argued that the continued criminal prosecution of the defendant
subsequent to the suspension of his driver's license pending
prosecution established a violation of double jeopardy. 95 The
court disagreed, finding no double jeopardy violation. The court
stated that the suspension of the defendant's license was not
96
punishment and was not imposed at a separate proceeding.
In Barnes v. Tofany, 97 the New York Court of Appeals held
that the suspension of the defendant's driver's license pending
prosecution and the subsequent suspension pursuant to
defendant's conviction for driving while impaired did not violate
double jeopardy. 98 The court explained that the initial suspension
pending prosecution was "not necessarily punitive, but [was] a
procedure provided by the Legislature for the protection of the
traveling public." 99 The court stated that "suspension or
revocation of the privilege of operating a motor vehicle is
essentially civil in nature." 100
Additionally, in People v. Craft, 101 the defendant was arrested
for driving while intoxicated, and argued that the failure to give
Miranda warnings prior to the administration of a blood test
constituted both a violation of his right to counsel and his right
against self-incrimination. 102 The court rejected the defendant's
94. Id. at 2857. People v. Frank, 631 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1016 (Crim. Ct.
New York County 1995).

95. Id. See Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.
Ct. 1937 (1994); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).

96. Frank, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 1016. "[Wihile the Blockburger test compels
a finding that the 'offenses' are indeed similar, this court finds that the
suspension of defendant's license was neither punishment nor imposed in a
separate proceeding and that therefore this prosecution does not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause." Id.
97. 27 N.Y.2d 74, 261 N.E.2d 617, 313 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1970).
98. Id. at 77, 261 N.E.2d at 619, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 693.

99. Id.
100. Id. at 78, 261 N.E.2d at 619, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
101. 28 N.Y.2d 273, 270 N.E.2d 297, 321 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1971).
102. Id. at 275-76, 270 N.E.2d at 298, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 567-68.
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argument and explained that section 1194 of the VTL was
designed to enable the law enforcement officials to effectively
deal with the problem of drunken drivers by immediate
revocation of their driver's licenses. 103
Thus, the court in Frankconcluded that the primary purpose of
a driver's license suspension was remedial rather than
punitive. 104 A review of the legislative history surrounding the
sanction confirmed the remedial purpose of the suspension
pending prosecution.105 Consequently, the court in Frank
concluded that the initial suspension of defendant's driver's
license at his arraignment was not punishment and, therefore, did
not trigger double jeopardy. 106
In analyzing the facts of Frank, the court utilized the
Blockburger test to determine the constitutionality of successive
prosecutions. The determination of whether two offenses are the
same for double jeopardy purposes is based upon whether either
offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not. 107
Although the Blockburger test had been violated, the defendant
failed to demonstrate that he was subjected to multiple
punishments imposed at a separate proceeding. 10 8 Therefore, the
court concluded that the defendant was provided no greater
protection under the New York State Double Jeopardy Clause
than he would have received under the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Federal Constitution. 109

103. Id. at 278, 270 N.E.2d at 300, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
104. People v. Frank, 631 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017 (Crim. Ct. New York

County 1995).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1017-18.

107. See supra text accompanying note 90.
108. Frank, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 1017.
109. Id.
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